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Commentary 
Gerry Gallery 
Discount Rates in Disarray: Evidence on Flawed Goodwill Impairment 
Testing 
 
Carlin and Finch, this issue, compare goodwill impairment discount rates 
used by a sample of large Australian firms with ‘independently’ generated 
discount rates. Their objective is to empirically determine whether managers 
opportunistically select goodwill discount rates subsequent to the 2005 
introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 
Australia. This is a worthwhile objective given that IFRS introduced an 
impairment regime, and within this regime, discount rate selection plays a 
key role in goodwill valuation decisions. It is also timely to consider the 
goodwill valuation issue. Following the recent downturn in the economy, 
there is a high probability that many firms will be forced to write down 
impaired goodwill arising from boom period acquisitions. Hence, evidence 
of bias in rate selection is likely to be of major concern to investors, 
policymakers and corporate regulators. Carlin and Finch claim their findings 
provide evidence of such bias. In this commentary I review the validity of 
their claims. 
 
The (unstated) theoretical argument adopted in this study is based on agency 
theory. It is assumed that self-interested managers, in the absence of 
effective monitoring mechanisms, have incentives to opportunistically select 
discount rates. Carlin and Finch suggest this opportunism may manifest 
itself in the selection of excessively low or high discount rates depending on 
differing incentives; for example, to inflate or dampen earnings or to ‘take 
“big baths”’ (note 16). Evidence of high deviation from an independently 
determined (or theoretically correct) discount rate would therefore provide 
evidence of opportunism. However, it is not clear why managers would have 
this preference, even in the presence of incentives to inflate or deflate 
earnings. Arguably, managers could more discretely manage other, less 
transparent valuation inputs such as cash flow projections or terminal 
valuation assumptions that are not required disclosures under AASB 136 
Impairment of Assets. 
 
There may also be alternative theoretical reasons for why discount rates may 
deviate from an independently determined rate. Consistent with signalling 
theory, some managers may prefer to signal the underlying value of their 
assets by selecting asset-specific discount rates that more accurately reflect 
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economic reality. Therefore, the applied discount rate may materially differ 
from an independently determined rate, not because managers are acting 
opportunistically but because managers have more information about the 
values of cash-generating units (CGU) than outsiders to the firm. It could 
also be argued that an observed wide dispersion in rates may simply reflect 
difficulties managers experienced in initially complying with IFRS. Indeed, 
many companies extensively relied on external audit firm guidance in the 
transition to IFRS in 2006.1
As the validity of the independently determined discount rate is central to 
the study’s findings it is important to consider how these rates are 
determined and applied. Carlin and Finch select a sample of 105 firms from 
the Top 200 ASX-listed firms by market capitalisation as at 31 December 
2006. As it is assumed a ‘whole of firm’ discount rate is comparable with an 
independently determined discount rate, only firms applying such a single 
rate are included in the sample, leading to the rejection of 95 firms for using 
multiple rates or other methods. Thus, the sample selection process limits the 
study to less than a quarter of listed firms reporting goodwill in 2006.
 Thus, in the absence of a detailed analysis of 
incentives and managerial responses, it is not obvious why managers, on 
average, would be expected to manipulate discount rates. 
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1 See Gallery, Cooper and Sweeting (2008). 
2 There were 470 firms listed on the ASX that reported goodwill in the 2006 reporting year. 
 
 
For the remaining sample of firms, the single discount rates are extracted 
from note disclosures and are compared to an ‘independently’ determined 
discount rate. This independently determined rate (in effect, the firm’s cost 
of equity capital) is estimated using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) 
and the unlevered company Beta, a risk premium of 6% and a risk-free rate 
of 5.885% (measured in December 2006) as inputs into the model. Betas are 
sourced from AspectHuntley’s FinAnalysis in the first quarter of 2007. This 
estimation procedure is questionable for a number of reasons. 
 
First, the assumption that the CAPM method is the appropriate method to 
use is not consistent with the applicable accounting standard, as indicated in 
the guidance provide in AASB 136 Impairment of Assets: 
 
A17. As a starting point in making such an estimate, the entity might take into 
account the following rates: 
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(a) the entity’s weighted average cost of capital determined using techniques 
such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model; (b) the entity’s incremental borrowing 
rate; and (c) other market borrowing rates. 
 
A18. However, these rates must be adjusted: 
(a) to reflect the way that the market would assess the specific risks associated 
with the asset’s estimated cash flows; and (b) to exclude risks that are not 
relevant to the asset’s estimated cash flows or for which the estimated cash 
flows have been adjusted. Consideration should be given to risks such as 
country risk, currency risk and price risk. 
 
From the above extracts, it is clear that an entity’s weighted average cost of 
capital (and CAPM) is just one starting point for estimating an appropriate 
asset-specific discount rate. Although the CAPM approach may be 
defensible on theoretical grounds,3 for some firms the complexity and cost in 
estimating CAPM inputs could justify the use of an entity’s incremental 
borrowing rate or another market borrowing rate. In these circumstances, 
given the low cost of debt capital in 2006, there is a high probability that the 
cost of debt was lower than the cost of equity in that year. Hence, the 
selection of a borrowing rate may lead to a rate significantly lower than any 
independently determined, whole of firm rate based on CAPM.4
Second, sound estimates of the cost of capital are crucial for the evaluation 
of investments and for corporate valuation. Current state-of-the-art 
methodology for estimating the cost of equity capital avoids using the 
traditional CAPM approach due to its imprecision. Other methods or 
 
Unfortunately, companies are not required to, and rarely disclose which of 
the three starting point rates they use in determining their discount rates. 
 
It is also relevant to note that, in accordance with AASB 136, Para A18, only 
‘specific’ asset risks should be included in estimating relevant discount rates 
and these should include country, currency and price risk. While it is 
difficult to know how these risks affect rate determination, it is reasonable to 
expect that such risks lead to rates that deviate from independently 
determined discount rates that do not incorporate such risk adjustments. 
Ample evidence is provided in company note disclosures to suggest that 
managers do, in practice, adjust rates to reflect specific assets risks. 
 
                                                 
3 See Husmann and Schmidt (2008). 
4 Husmann and Schmidt (2008) come to a similar conclusion in their comparative analysis of discount 
rates. 
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adjustments to the traditional CAPM model have become the norm in capital 
markets research (for example, the Fama/French three-factor model, or a 
variation to this model). A recent alternative approach uses a market-implied 
cost of equity capital for a particular firm, defined as the internal rate of 
return that equates the current stock price to the present value of the 
market’s expected future residual flows to common shareholders (see 
Botosan and Plumlee 2002; Easton 2004). 
 
Even where in practice the simplistic CAPM model is used, adjustments are 
often made to reflect the term structure of interest rates and uncertainty 
about the risk premium. For example, Stulz (1999) argues increased 
globalisation has caused equity premia to decline in all markets. If firms use 
some of these alternative methods, or use a CAPM method with a risk 
premium lower or greater than 6%, their discount rates may deviate 
considerably from the independently determined rates.5
In recognition that their independently determined rate may be subject to 
estimation error, Carlin and Finch use an arbitrarily determined tolerance 
threshold of 150 bps. A whole-of-firm rate that falls outside this threshold is 
attributable to opportunism. The reported results (Table 3) show a very wide 
rate of dispersion with only 31 (30%) firms disclosing rates falling within 
the tolerance threshold and 74 (70%) firms disclosing rates that fall outside 
the threshold. Surprisingly, 53 (50%) of firms disclose rates that fall outside 
a wider 250 bps threshold. In their industry analysis (Table 4), half of the 
industries examined have more than 75% of firms with rates falling outside 
the 250 bps threshold. No supplementary analysis and little explanation is 
provided for such wide dispersion, but such an outcome could be expected if 
the model parameters used to generate the independently determined rates 
were estimated with considerable error. The prospect that the selection of 
goodwill discount rates may be due to non-opportunistic factors is further 
reinforced in the goodwill intensity analysis (Table 5). When the discount 
 Thus, the discretion 
in rate determination permitted by AASB 136 and the diversity in 
CAPM/cost of capital estimation practices raises doubt about the validity of 
comparing standardised independently determined rates with whole-of-firm 
rates. 
 
                                                 
5 Despite the authors’ reassurances in the paper, their other CAPM input measures are also questionable. 
The commercially sourced Beta values are not timely (the first quarter of 2007) and are modified (bounded 
at a maximum of 2 and a minimum of 0.5). Likewise, the risk-free rate proxy of 5.885% is the December 
2006, 10-year Australian government bond rate rather than the more appropriate June 2006 rate of 5.79%. 
Also, using an Australian rate may overstate the rate applicable to foreign CGUs. 
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rate variance is stratified by goodwill intensity scores (goodwill/net profit 
before tax), contrary to expectation, firms with the higher intensity scores 
(that is, with the most to lose from impairment write-downs) do not tend to 
select discount rates that fall outside the tolerance threshold. Alternatively, 
goodwill intensity may interact with other relevant factors such as firm size, 
firm performance, goodwill age, industry categorisation, and so on, in 
influencing managers’ selection of discount rates. However, multivariate 
methods that could potentially capture the effects of such interactions are not 
employed in this study. 
 
 
Given the major concerns I have identified above, it is difficult to accept the 
claim that managers are acting opportunistically and biasing their goodwill 
discount rates. Consequently, I am not convinced that the paper, with its 
limited sample and early IFRS study year offers sufficient evidence to 
support the conclusion that, in Australia, goodwill impairment testing is 
‘flawed’ and goodwill ‘discount rates are in disarray’. While this research, 
through its informative insights into rate selection practices, provides a good 
starting point from which such conclusions may ultimately be substantiated, 
future research should consider a more rigorous analysis of how and why 
firms select discount rates. The information disclosed in the note disclosures 
of company financial statements offers a rich source of information in which 
to explore the complexities associated with discount rate selection and 
valuation decisions. I encourage future researchers to delve into these 
disclosures in their quest to better understand the nature and consequences of 
those decisions. 
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